Testied seals what happens around a fall, a restraint or a delivery the moment it happens, with a signature kept outside your systems and a time stamp from an independent authority. Years later, anyone can check the record, and nobody can quietly rewrite it.
The sample incident on this page is synthetic. Its hashes, signatures and FreeTSA time stamps are real, and your browser is checking them now.
Ward 3 · Bed 302B · synthetic
17 of 17 integrity tests pass, including an insider re-signing the ledger with a stolen key.
RFC 3161 time stamps from an independent authority, checked end to end against its root.
Ed25519 signatures, with a key the ledger refuses to keep beside its own records.
Restraint records follow Article 39-7 and Annex 7 of the Enforcement Rule of Korea's Medical Service Act; missing items are sealed as gaps.
When a family sues or an auditor asks, the question is rarely what happened in general. It is what was recorded, when, and whether anyone touched it since. Courts weigh the gaps and the times.
105 minutes with no fetal monitoring or nursing entries in the delivery room weighed against the hospital. Report
A patient's fall in hospital: KRW 282 million, with the hospital held 60% responsible. Case
A caesarean 25 minutes after documented bradycardia was held appropriate, and a KRW 1.5 billion claim was dismissed. The times were on record. Report
As reported in Korean medical and legal press. Testied does not make a record complete. It makes a record provable, including what is missing from it.
Testied makes no sensors and reads nothing clinical. It takes events from the systems already in the room and seals them in order. The values below are from the sample incident.
Bed-exit radar, nurse call, badge readers and the EMR send events as they happen. Each is kept exactly as the vendor sent it.
event BED_EXIT_DETECTED source bed-exit radar time 21:34:52
Each record is hashed into a chain with the one before it and signed with an Ed25519 key held outside the ledger.
prev cdc44d… hash 7b451a… sig ed25519 715e85f8…
An independent RFC 3161 authority signs each record's hash. A record rewritten later gets a late stamp, and the check reports it.
tsa FreeTSA genTime 21:35:13 lag +0.3 s
The head of the chain, signed and stamped, goes to people outside the hospital. Any rewrite before a checkpoint fails, even with the key.
head seq 4 · baf6e0… sent guardian, insurer tsa 21:35:54
This is the incident from the top of the page, with its real hashes, signatures and time stamps. Change anything below and your browser re-checks the whole chain, the way an expert witness would.
Checking…
| # | Record | Content hash | Link to previous | Signature | Time stamp |
|---|
Hashes, links, signatures and the checkpoint are checked in your browser with SHA-256 and Ed25519. The FreeTSA tokens are checked with OpenSSL; download one and follow the steps at the end of the page.
Designed as record-sealing software. Its regulatory classification has not yet been confirmed by Korea's Ministry of Food and Drug Safety.
From systems already in the room, in the order things happened.
So the record stays neutral, and courts can trust it.
Planned, not yet built. From 27 May 2027, Korea limits prosecution for accidents in high-risk essential care, childbirth included, when the hospital has monitored and explained as required. Both have to be shown from records.
Every figure on this site is either measured, with its date, or marked as planned. Nothing here is a customer, a certification or a clinical outcome, because none exist yet.
| Item | Status | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Integrity test suite | Measured | 17 of 17 passing on 9 November 2026Outside edits, insider re-signing, late re-stamping, rewrites after a checkpoint, deletions, forged checkpoints, concurrent writers, time-stamp outages. |
| Independent time stamps | Measured | Token from FreeTSA verified against its root, 9 November 2026 |
| The sample on this page | Measured | 4 records sealed with the production code and FreeTSA, re-checked in your browser |
| Batch stamping | Planned | One time stamp per minute of events through a Merkle tree, for hospitals with thousands of beds |
| Delivery-room records | Planned | Fetal monitoring traces, decision-to-delivery times, explanation and consent |
| Security certification | Planned | ISMS-P in Korea, SOC 2 in the United States |
| Integrations | Planned | EMR, nurse call and bed-exit sensor vendors |
| United States rules | Planned | Restraint and seclusion records under 42 CFR 482.13 |
| First hospitals | Target | Pilots with Korean obstetric and long-term care hospitals |
| Where this is headed | Target | Serving the world's largest hospitalsNot achieved. Stated so the work is measured against it. |
Annual contracts. The first ward runs free for 90 days. Prices exclude VAT. Set on 9 November 2026.
Wards and long-term care hospitals
$9per bed per month
₩9,900 per bed per month in Korea
Labour, delivery and caesarean rooms
$290per delivery room per month
₩390,000 per room per month in Korea
1,000 beds or more, or outside Korea
Quoteper contract
Priced with you
Testied is edition 22 of SIMUL, a fully orchestrated company built by simul.risconlabs.com. Its people and its office are synthetic. Its product code, its tests and the ledger on this page are real.
The hospital room at the top was generated with the World Labs API from a text prompt. It is an illustration. No generated image is used in any check, and no real patient or hospital appears on this site.
Directors of quality and patient safety, hospital counsel, and heads of obstetrics who need records that hold up years later without adding a single click for the nurses who make them.
One file holds everything needed to re-check the sample: the records, their signatures, the public key and the time-stamp tokens.
event_time_ms, prev_hash, record_type, recorded_time_ms, seq, signer_pubkey_hex, stream_id, subject_id as JSON with sorted keys and no spaces. SHA-256 of RISCON-EVIDENCE-V3, a newline, that header, a newline and payload_json must equal record_hash, and prev_hash must equal the hash of the record before it.signature_hex over that hash with Ed25519 and the published key 8245cf25…4b41 (fingerprint 00793eba…e844).tsa_token_b64 as a binary file and run openssl ts -verify -digest <record_hash> -token_in -in record.tst -CAfile cacert.pem with FreeTSA's root certificate.